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THE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF POSTJUDGMENT DEBTORS
AND CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGORS
DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ*
ANDREW H.
I.

BAIDA**

INTRODUCTION

The Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment provides
"nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law."' Although this may well represent an
essential principle of a democratic society, it has also long been the
inspiration of a litigious one and has prompted the Supreme Court
to observe that "[m]any controversies have raged about the cryptic
and abstract words of the Due Process Clause." 2 Recently, this constitutional provision has been the basis for a spate of civil actions in
federal courts throughout the country challenging state procedures
that enable creditors to collect judgments or court ordered child
support awards from third parties. These suits contest the constitutionality of either a state's postjudgment garnishment or attachment
procedure, or procedures established pursuant to state programs
designed to intercept tax refunds for the purpose of satisfying
past due child support arrearages. 4 These cases raise questions
* Ms. Motz is a partner with Frank, Bernstein, Conaway & Goldman, Baltimore,
Maryland, and Former Chief of Litigation, Office of the Attorney General of Maryland.
B.A. 1965, Vassar College; L.L.B. 1968, University of Virginia Law School.
** B.A. 1980,J.D. 1983, University of Maryland. Mr. Baida is an Assistant Attorney
General, Office of the Attorney General of Maryland.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
3. See Green v. Harbin, 615 F. Supp. 719 (N.D. Ala. 1985); Neeley v. Century Fin.
Co., 606 F. Supp. 1453 (D. Ariz. 1985); Reigh v. Schleigh, 595 F. Supp. 1535 (D. Md.
1984), vacated and remanded, No. 85-1021 (4th Cir. Mar. 4, 1986); McCahey v. L.P. Investors, 593 F. Supp. 319 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), afld, 774 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1985); Clay v. EdwardJ. Fisher, Jr., M.D., Inc., 584 F. Supp. 730 (S.D. Ohio 1984); Dionne v. Bouley, 583
F. Supp. 307 (D.R.I. 1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 757 F.2d 1344 (1st Cir. 1985); Harris
v. Bailey, 574 F. Supp. 966 (W.D. Va. 1983); Phillips v. Robinson Jewelers, Inc., No.
CIV-81-190 BT (W.D. Okla. 1982); Deary v. Guardian Loan Co., 534 F. Supp. 1178
(S.D.N.Y. 1982).
4. See, e.g., Coughlin v. Regan, 584 F. Supp. 697 (D. Me. 1984); McClelland v. Massinga, 600 F. Supp. 558 (D. Md. 1984), reV'd and remanded, No. 85-1138 (4th Cir. Mar. 18,
1986); Nelson v. Regan, 560 F. Supp. 1101 (D. Conn. 1983), aFd on other groznds. 731
F.2d 105 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub norn. Manning v. Nelson, 105 S. Ct. 175 (1984); Marcello v. Regan, 574 F. Supp. 586 (D.R.I. 1983): Sorenson v. Secretary of the Treasury of
the United States, 557 F. Supp. 729 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
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regarding the type of notice and hearing that must be afforded
postjudgment debtors (or child support obligors5 ) in order to comply with modern era views of due process.
II.

BACKGROUND

The Supreme Court's most recent discussion of a judgment
debtor's postjudgment due process rights occurred more than sixty
years ago in Endicott-Johnson Corp. v. Encyclopedia Press, Inc.6 There,
the Court held that it was not necessary to provide notice and an
opportunity to be heard before the issuance of a writ of garnishment
on a debtor's wages. The Court reasoned that, since the judgment
debtor had already "been granted an opportunity to be heard and
has had his day in court" on the merits, he was put on notice that an
attachment would follow and was entitled to no further notice or
hearing.7
5. A child support obligor would seem to be in a position identical to that of a
postjudgment debtor for purposes of due process analysis. At some time in the past,
each had an opportunity to contest in court whether he or she owed an obligation to
another individual and, in each case, a court determined that the debtor or obligor was,
indeed, liable. Although an obligor, unlike a debtor, may have entered into a voluntary
agreement to pay child support, this does not diminish the existence of the obligor's
liablity or the fact that it has been determined by a court and so is binding as a matter of
law. See, e.g., Stern v. Stern, 58 Md. App. 280, 473 A.2d 56 (1984). An obligor who has
consented to pay court ordered child support, like a defauh judgment debtor or consent
judgment debtor, is still, after entry ofjudgment, a postjudgment debtor. See Finberg v.
Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc).
That an obligor is obliged to make payments in the future, or has more defenses
than an ordinary judgment debtor by which to challenge the underlying support order,
means only that the obligor is in a more favorable position with regard to effecting
changes or modifications to the underlying order. Except for the right to seek modification, an obligor is clearly not in any way in a more favorable position than an ordinary
judgment debtor. To the contrary, a support recipient can use all of the collection tools
available to a judgment creditor together with several additional remedies provided by
statute and by case law. For example, a court can order the immediate sequestration of
the real and personal property of a parent who is delinquent in support obligations. See
Wooddy v. Wooddy, 258 Md. 224, 265 A.2d 467 (1970); Donigan v. Donigan, 208 Md.
511, 119 A.2d 430 (1956); see generally MD. R.P. 2-647 through 2-651. Unlike an ordinary
judgment debtor, an individual failing to pay support can be imprisoned for nonpayment. See MD. CONST. art. III, § 38. And a wage garnishment order to collect child
support is given priority over garnishment order by judgment creditors. See MD. FAM.
LAW CODE ANN. § 10-125(c) (1984 & Supp. 1985). These factors, therefore, have no
effect on an obligor's duties pursuant to that order. Like the judgment debtor, an obligor is under a court order to pay.
At least two courts have recognized that the status of the child support obligor is
equivalent to that of a postjudgment debtor. SeeJahn v. Regan, 584 F. Supp. 399, 413
(E.D. Mich. 1984); Hudson v. Tweed, Civ. No. 82-363-WKS (D. Del. 1983) (magistrate's
opinion), afld, 749 F.2d 26 (3d Cir. 1984).
6. 266 U.S. 285 (1924).
7. Id. at 288.
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In 1968 the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hanner v.
Demarcus' to determine whether Endicott-Johnson should be overruled. In that case, the Arizona Supreme Court had upheld as constitutionally sufficient a state procedure that provided for notice of
the underlying debt, but for no additional notice of intent to execute.' Although the respondent initially argued in opposing certiorari that the sole federal question in the case had been decided by
Endicott-Johnson, he claimed in his brief on the merits that the question was not before the Supreme Court because Arizona statutes did
require that the debtor be given actual notice. It was probably for
this reason that the Supreme Court ultimately dismissed the writ of
certiorari as improvidently granted.'"
Writing for himself and two other Justices, Justice Douglas dissented from the dismissal of certiorari, arguing that an appropriate
federal question did exist and noting that the rationale and holding
of Endicott-Johnson-"thatdue process does not require notifying a
judgment debtor of execution on his property'' -had never been
reaffirmed by the Court. Justice Douglas specifically relied upon
Griffin v. Griffin,' 2 which he characterized as having rejected the Endicott-Johnson rationale some years earlier.' 3 It is not at all clear that
this is so;" in any event, the Supreme Court has not since addressed
8. Hanner v. DeMarcus, cert. granted, 389 U.S. 926, cert. dismissed as improvidently
granted, 390 U.S. 736, reh'g denied, 392 U.S. 917 (1968).

9. Knight v. DeMarcus, 102 Ariz. 105, 425 P.2d 837 (1967) (special master entitled
to a writ of execution without providing notice of intent to execute when party refused
to pay special master's fee within prescribed time period after receiving notice of the
order).
10. See Hanner, 390 U.S. at 737-38 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
11. Id. at 740 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
12. 327 U.S. 220, reh'g denied, 328 U.S. 876 (1946).
13. Hanner, 390 U.S. at 741 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
14. In Griffin, the petitioner was ordered, pursuant to a divorce proceeding, to pay
the respondent, his ex-wife, $3,000 a year in alimony. 327 U.S. at 223. In 1936, after a
hearing before a referee on the amount of past due alimony and the petitioner's ability
to pay, the New York Supreme Court entered an order dated February 25, 1936, declaring that the petitioner owed $18,493.64 in alimony arrears and interest as of October
25, 1935. Id. at 223-24. The respondent subsequently and successfully moved to have
an order entered on February 19, 1938, docketing a judgment against the petitioner in
the amount of $25,382.75, the higher amount being attributable to additional past due
alimony payments and accrued interest that had accumulated since October 25, 1935.
Id. at 224. However, unlike the arrears attributable to the 1936 order, the additional
arrears were never contested, either as to the amount or to the petititioner's ability to
pay, by the petitioner, who was never informed of the 1938 judgment. 1d. at 224-25.
Although the Supreme Court held that the judgment attributable to arrears and
interest accruing since October 25, 1935 was ineffective, it specifically upheld the portion
that had accrued prior to that date.
The 1938judgment, so far as it confirmed the 1936 order by which petitioner
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the viability of Endicott-Johnson.15
Accordingly, lower courts have applied Endicott-Johnson over the
years and have concluded that postgarnishment statutes that do not
provide any notice to the judgment debtor do not deprive the
debtor of due process.' 6 Moreover, although the Court in EndicottJohnson held only that "in the absence of a statutory requirement, it
is not essential that [the judgment debtor] be given notice before the
issuance of an execution against his tangible property," 17 a number
of lower courts have seized upon the broad dicta in the opinion and
have held that no notice or hearing need be provided at the time of
execution. 8
However, since 1980 no court has been willing to extend the
Endicott-Johnson rationale in this way or even to regard the EndicottJohnson analysis as good law.' 9 Rather, beginning with the Third
Circuit's en banc decision in Finbergv. Sullivan,2 ° courts have almost
uniformly questioned the continuing applicability of the EndicottJohnson rationale. 2 ' This is attributable to two developments-one
was already bound, impaired no rights of petitioner, and foreclosed no defense
which he had not had opportunity to offer. Dueprocess does not require that notice be
given before confirmation of rights theretofore established in a proceeding of which adequate
notice was given. Upon the facts shown, respondent was therefore entitled to maintain
the present suit on the 1938 judgment for the amount, with interest, thus adjudicated to be due by the order of 1936, and as so adjudicated, confirmed by the
judgment of 1938.
Id. at 233-34 (emphasis added). Therefore, as to the adjudicated arrearage, the Court
specifically upheld the respondent's right to recover, pursuant to the state procedure,
the pre-October 25, 1935 amount from the petitioner without further notice. Contrary
to the suggestion made by Justice Douglas in his dissent in Hanner, Griffin seems to be
wholly consistent with Endicott-Johnson.
15. However, in Moya v. DeBaca, 286 F. Supp. 606 (D.N.M. 1968), appeal dismissed,
395 U.S. 825 (1969) twoJustices indicated that they would vacate the district court judgment upholding a postjudgment wage garnishment procedure and would remand the
case to be re-examined under Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). See
infra note 25 and accompanying text; see also Danila v. Dobrea, cert. denied, 391 U.S. 949,
reh g denied, 392 U.S. 947, 950 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (indicating that the issue
in that case, similar to that raised in Hanner, was a "substantial one which should be
decided by this Court").
16. See, e.g., Moya v. DeBaca, 286 F. Supp. at 607-08.
17. 266 U.S. at 288 (emphasis added).
18. See, e.g., Halpern v. Austin, 385 F. Supp. 1009 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Katz v. Ke Nam
Kim, 379 F. Supp. 65 (D. Hawaii 1974); Langford v. State of Tennessee, 356 F. Supp.
1163 (W.D.Tenn. 1973) (per curiam); Moya v. DeBaca, 286 F. Supp. at 606.
19. Although the Fifth Circuit did uphold the constitutionality of a postjudgment
garnishment procedure in Brown v. Liberty Loan Corp., it did so for other reasons. 539
F.2d 1355 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 949 (1977). See infra notes 35-36 and
accompanying text.
20. 634 F.2d 50 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc).
21. See, e.g., Reigh v. Schleigh, 595 F. Supp. 1535, 1548-49 (1). Md. 1984), vacated and
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in the factual posture of these cases and the other in the law-that
the courts have found significant.
The factual development was the enactment, after Endicott-Johnson, of various state and federal statutory provisions that exempt
certain assets from attachment to satisfy debts.2" With regard to
these exempted assets, the debtor obviously has not yet had his or
her "day in court." Finberg and its progeny, therefore, have found
the existence of these exemptions to indicate that the Endicott-Johnson analysis is no longer tenable.2 3 Moreover, the courts have found
this conclusion particularly compelling in light of more recent
Supreme Court pronouncements 24on the due process rights of debtors in garnishment proceedings.
All of the more recent Supreme Court decisions, however, have
interpreted the rights of prejudgment, as opposed to postjudgment,
debtors. In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,25 for example, the Court
held that due process requires that prejudgment debtors be afforded
notice and an opportunity to be heard before their wages can be
frozen by creditors pending the resolution of an ongoing action.2 6
Three years later, in Fuentes v. Shevin, 27 the Court applied the same
rationale to prejudgment replevin procedures. It held shortly thereafter, however, in Mitchell v. W.T Grant Co. ,28 that a prejudgment
debtor's due process rights were not violated by a procedure that
provided, first, for the seizure of goods encumbered by a security
remanded, No. 85-1021 (4th Cir. Mar. 4, 1986); Clay v. EdwardJ. Fisher, Jr., M.D., Inc.,
584 F. Supp. 730, 732 (S.D. Ohio 1984); Harris v. Bailey, 574 F. Supp. 966, 969 (W.D.
Va. 1983); Phillips v. Robinson Jewelers, Inc., No. CIV-81-190 BT (W.D. Okla. 1982);
Deary v. Guardian Loan Co., 534 F. Supp. 1178, 1185-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); see also
Dionne v. Bouley, 583 F. Supp. 307, 314-15 (D.R.I. 1984), affd in part, revd in part, 757
F.2d 1344 (1 st Cir. 1985);see also Haines v. General Motors Corp., 603 F. Supp. 471,476
n.3 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (court expressly noting it is bound by controlling case law such as
Endicott-Johnson when it has not been overruled). But see Neeley v. Century Fin. Co., 606
F. Supp. 1453, 1461 (D. Ariz. 1985).
22. For example, Social Security benefits are exempt from attachment under 42
U.S.C. § 407(a) (1982). Some ERISA benefits are also exempt. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1)
(1982). Maryland exempts, as do most states, a certain amount of cash, MD. CTS. &JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. §11-504 (1984 & Supp. 1985), as well as benefits available under state
public assistance programs. MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, § 73 (1985).
23. See, e.g., Finberg, 634 F.2d at 56-57; Deary v. Guardian Loan Co., 534 F. Supp.
1178, 1185-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
24. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67 (1972); Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); North Georgia Finishing,
Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
25. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
26. Id. at 341-42.
27. 407 U.S. 67, 96-97 (1972).
28. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
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interest, and then notice and an opportunity for a hearing afterward.
By contrast, in North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc. ,29 Georgia's prejudgment garnishment procedure was successfully challenged because it afforded debtors neither notice and a hearing
before the garnishment, nor sufficient procedural safeguards such
as those discussed in Mitchell."°
This line of Supreme Court decisions 3 ' culminated in Mathews
v. Eldridge,3 2 in which the Court formally articulated a three-pronged
balancing test to be utilized when analyzing the constitutionality of a
challenged government procedure that allegedly deprives individuals of their liberty or property interests. 3 3 Under Mathews, due process analysis requires consideration of three factors: (1) "the private
interest that will be affected by the official action"; (2) "the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interests through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards"; and (3) "the Government's interest, including
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that
the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail."3 4
The first postjudgment garnishment case to apply the balancing
test set forth in Mathews was Brown v. Liberty Loan Corp., in which
the Fifth Circuit held Florida's postjudgment garnishment provisions constitutional.3 6 Although Brown and another case decided
29. 419 U.S. 601, 606-08 (1975).
30. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
31. See also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (prison procedure resulting in
loss of good-time credit or imposition of solitary confinement must afford written notice
of alleged violation, opportunity to prepare a defense, written statement by factfinders,
and opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence); Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parole revocation procedure required to provide notice of
claimed violation, disclosure to parolee of evidence against him, opportunity to present
witnesses and documentary evidence, right to cross-examine and confront witnesses,
neutral factfinder, and written statement of reasons for parole revocation); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (except in emergency situations, a state must afford notice and
an opportunity for a hearing before depriving an individual of a driver's license);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (pretermination evidentiary hearing must be
held before public assistance payments to welfare recipients are cut off).
32. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
33. Id. at 334-35. Neither Ma thews, however, nor any of the prior Supreme Court
decisions that led to the adoption of the balancing test, addresses the rights of postjudgment debtors. Cf.Langford v. State, 356 F. Supp. 1163, 1165 (W.D. Tenn. 1973) (rejecting Sniadach and Fuentes based on this distinction). See also Halpern v. Austin, 385 F.
Supp. 1009, 1013 (W.D. Ga. 1974) ("absent special circumstances, Sniadach and its progeny should be limited to pre-judgment summary seizures").
34. 424 U.S. at 335.
35. 539 F.2d 1355 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 949 (1977).
36. Id. at 1369. Other decisions issued shortly after .1Iathews recognized the need to
"accommodate" the debtor's and creditor's interests. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v.Hasty,
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shortly after Mathews both upheld postjudgment attachment procedures on constitutional grounds, 7 courts have since taken an almost
complete "about-face," beginning with the seminal decision in
Finberg v. Sullivan. 8
In Finberg, the Third Circuit held that the challenged Pennsylvania postjudgment garnishment procedures did not adequately
protect a judgment debtor's interests, nor fairly accommodate the
interests of both debtors and creditors. 3 9 Though acknowledging
that predeprivation notice and a hearing were not required by due
process, 40 the court determined that the judgment debtor's "compelling" interest in asserting exemptions in order to regain use of
money in her seized bank account demanded a "prompt" postseizure hearing. 4 ' Because the garnishment rules failed to comply
with this requirement, the judgment debtor was not afforded an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and, therefore, was not
afforded due process. 42 Additionally, because the rules did not require that judgment debtors be supplied with notice containing information concerning exemptions to which they might be entitled,
the rules provided constitutionally inadequate notice.43
Finberg represents the first of a new, but increasingly long, line
410 F. Supp. 482, 490 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (upholding Michigan's postjudgment garnishment statute and rules).
37. See First Nat'l Bank v. Hasty, 410 F. Supp. 482 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
38. 634 F.2d 50. See Green v. Harbin, 615 F. Supp. 719 (N.D. Ala. 1985); Neeley v.
Century Fin. Co., 606 F. Supp. 1453 (D. Ariz. 1985); Reigh v, Schleigh, 595 F. Supp.
1535 (D. Md. 1984), vacated and remanded, No. 85-1021 (4th Cir. Mar. 4, 1986); Clay v.
Edward J. Fisher, Jr., M.D., Inc., 584 F. Supp. 730 (S.D. Ohio 1984); Harris v. Bailey,
574 F. Supp. 966 (W.D. Va. 1983); Deary v. Guardian Loan Co., 534 F. Supp. 1178 (S.D.
N.Y. 1982); Phillips v. Robinson Jewelers, Inc., No. CIV-81-190 BT (W.D. Okla. 1982);
see also Dionne v. Bouley, 583 F. Supp. 307 (D.R.I. 1984), afd in part, rev'd in part, 757
F.2d 1344 (1st Cir. 1985). Butsee McCahey v. L.P. Investors, 593 F. Supp. 319 (E.D.N.Y.
1984), aff'd, 774 F.2d 543 (2d Cir. 1985) (New York procedure, after being initially
found unconstitutional, upheld following revision). With regard to the application of
the Mathews test to attachment procedures that affect child support obligors, see, e.g.,
Coughlin v. Regan, 584 F. Supp. 697, 707 (D. Me. 1984); McClelland v. Massinga, 600 F.
Supp. 558, 566 (D. Md. 1984), rev'd and remanded, No. 85-1138 (4th Cir. Mar. 18, 1986);
Jahn v. Regan, 584 F. Supp. 399, 414-17 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Nelson v. Regan, 560 F.
Supp. 1101, 1107-09 (D. Conn 1983), arffd on other grounds, 731 F.2d 105 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. Manning v. Nelson, 105 S. Ct. 175 (1984); Marcello v. Regan, 574 F.
Supp. 586, 596-98 (D.R.I. 1983); Sorenson v. Secretary of the Treasury of the United
States, 557 F. Supp. 729, 738 (W.D. Wash. 1982), affd on other grounds, 752 F.2d 1433
(9th Cir. 1985).
39. 634 F.2d at 59-62.
40. Id. at 59.
41. Id. at 58-59.
42. Id. at 59-61.
43. Id. at 61-62.
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of cases in which various postjudgment garnishment procedures
have been held unconstitutional.4 4 But it must be remembered that
these cases all rely on Supreme Court precedent, beginning with
Sniadach, that addresses only the rights of persons prior to any judgment; thus, these decisions would not seem in any way to affect the
rationale of Endicott-Johnson, which, like Finberg and its progeny, involved a postjudgment claim of due process rights by a debtor who
had already received both notice and an opportunity to be heard
with regard to the underlying claim.
Although it is true that, unlike many of the modern era cases,
there was no claim of state or federal exemption from garnishment
in Endicott-Johnson, it is not at all clear that this factor alone is significant enough to overcome the fact that every postjudgment debtor
has had a day in court on the merits of the claim and been found
liable, and thus has been afforded both notice and opportunity to be
heard prior to any garnishment executing that judgment. Accordingly, it well may be, as the Fifth Circuit held in Brown v. Liberty Loan
Corp., that there is no constitutional right to notice or an immediate
postjudgment hearing even when there is a claim for exemption.4 5
Certainly, in other contexts, courts have held that there need be no
predeprivation or immediate postdeprivation hearing when the
party is afforded an eventual opportunity for judicial examination of
his or her legal rights.4 6
However, since the more recent cases almost unanimously reject the Endicott-Johnson rationale,4 7 the remainder of this article will
44. See supra note 38.
45. 539 F.2d at 1368-69. See also Finberg, 634 F.2d at 72 (Aldisert, J., dissenting)
("My position is not that Mrs. Finberg should not have an opportunity to assert her
exemption, but that the creditor's greater interest in enforcing its judgment diminishes
the urgency of the process that is due her.").
46. See, e.g., Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 598-99 (1950)
(statute permitting seizure upon probable cause to believe property is dangerous to
health is constitutional); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 595 (1931) (statute
allowing summary procedures to collect tax does not violate due process); United States
v. Articles of Hazardous Substance, 588 F.2d 39, 43 (4th Cir. 1978) (recognizing continued viability of Ewing despite series of cases beginning with Goldberg v. Kelly).
47. But see Neeley v. Century Fin. Co., 606 F. Supp. 1453 (D. Ariz. 1985), one of the
most recent cases dealing with the rights of postjudgment debtors, in which the court
found the Endicott-Johnson rationale not applicable "where a specific statute, either state
or federal, precludes certain assets from being subjected to liability for a person's
debts," but specifically held "where no exemption could possibly apply, the holding of EndirottJohnson must be applied and the procedure upheld under due process analysis as no further
due process is required." 606 F. Supp. at 1461 (emphasis added). See also Haines v.
General Motors Corp., 603 F. Supp. 471 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (recognizing Endicoit-Johnson
as controlling in the 6th Circuit).
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address the constitutionality of postjudgment garnishment procedures in light of the analysis contained in those cases and will specifically examine the following issues: (1) What type of notice must be
provided by postjudgment garnishment procedures in order to
comply with due process? and (2) What is the meaning of the phrase
"opportunity for a hearing at a meaningful time" in the context of
these and similar procedures that affect other classes of postjudgment debtors?4 8 With regard to the latter question, this article will
focus particular attention on the due process rights of child support
obligors.

III.

NOTICE

Finbergand its progeny purport to apply the Mathews v. Eldridge
balancing test to determine the adequacy of all challenged postgarnishment procedures. However, even though Mathews set forth a
specific test to be usid when determining whether "government
procedures" afford adequate due process, both Mathews and Finberg,
as well as the other post-Mathews postjudgment garnishment decisions, actually applied the test only to determine when and what sort
of a hearing must be provided. None of these cases articulate any
application of the Mathews factors to determine the type of notice that
is constitutionally adequate. Instead, courts have examined the
constitutional adequacy of the notice provided by a challenged government procedure in light of the principles elucidated in Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. ,4 and further explored in Memphis

Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft.5 ° In Mullane, the Supreme Court
held that if the Due Process Clause requires notice in a given situation, that notice must be "reasonably calculated under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the

48. Courts have resolved the notice issues raised in the postjudgment garnishment
cases in a substantially similar manner as those raised in the child support obligor cases.
Therefore, this article will address the notice questions only in the context of the garnishment decisions. However, as courts in these two areas have differed in the way they
address the issue of when an opportunity for a hearing should be afforded, both areas of
law will be considered with regard to that issue. See jifra notes 83-152 and accompanying
text.
49. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
50. 436 U.S. 1 (1978). Indeed, the Court in Memphis Light made absolutely no reference to Mathews when analyzing the adequacy of the termination notice used by the
municipal utility company. Id. at 13-15. Mathews was not cited until the Court addressed
the issue of whether the utility's customers received a meaningful opportunity for a
hearing. Id. at 16-19.
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action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections."'" The Court refined this language very minimally in Memphis
Light: "The purpose of notice under the Due Process Clause is to
apprise the affected individual of, and permit adequate preparation
for, an impending 'hearing.'"52
In Finberg and many of its progeny, the courts have concluded
that in order to be constitutionally adequate, the notice provided to
judgment debtors must contain a detailed explanation of the procedures available for pursuing exemptions and specifically list all, or at
least the principal, exemptions.5 3 However, this interpretation of
what constitutes adequate notice exceeds that mandated by the
Supreme Court in Mullane and Memphis Light. In those decisions the
Court merely required that notice be "reasonably calculated" to inform a party about the pendency of his or her case, not "specifically
calculated" to disclose every detail of the case. 5 4
The failure of the notice required by various postjudgment garnishment procedures to identify all (or the principal) exemptions, or
to detail formally and laboriously the precise procedures by which a
defense can be asserted, is constitutionally unimportant. The dispositive inquiry is whether the debtor is made aware that he or she
has the opportunity to contest the garnishment proceeding.5 5 The
Ninth Circuit recently arrived at precisely this conclusion in

51. 339 U.S. at 314 (citations omitted).
52. 436 U.S. at 14.
53. See Finberg, 634 F.2d at 62; Clay v. EdwardJ. Fisher, Jr., M.D., Inc., 584 F. Supp.
730, 734 (S.D. Ohio 1984); Dionne v. Bouley, 583 F. Supp. 307, 317-18 (D.R.I. 1984),
rev'don this point, 757 F.2d 1344 (1st Cir. 1985); Harris v. Bailey, 574 F. Supp. 966, 971
(W.D. Va. 1983); Deary v. Guardian Loan Co., 534 F. Supp. 1178, 1187-88 (S.D.N.Y.
1982). But see McCahey v. L.P. Investors, 593 F. Supp. 319, 328 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), afrd,
774 F.2d 543, 550-52 (2d Cir. 1985) ("elaborate explanation" of procedures for asserting an exemption not constitutionally required).
54. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. Accord Adams v. Harris, 643 F.2d 995, 998 (4th Cir.
1981) (no constitutional requirement that social security disability applicants be informed with particularity of the medical and vocational reasons for denial of claim);
Wilson v. Heckler, 580 F. Supp. 1387, 1393 (D.D.C. 1984) (due process does not require
that supplemental social security income recipient be informed of mathematical calculations used to determine amount of benefits); see also Garrett v. Puett, 707 F.2d 930 (6th
Cir. 1983) (same); Owens v. I.F.P. Corp., 374 F. Supp. 1032, 1035 (W.D. Ky.), ajfd mere.,
419 U.S. 807 (1974) (service of a summons merely stating if defendants fail to appear
and defend, judgment of default will be entered, constitutes sufficient notice).
55. See McCahey v. L.P. Investors, 593 F. Supp. 319, 328 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aft'd, 774
F.2d 543 (2d Cir. 1985); see also Diotte v. Blum, 585 F. Supp. 887, 904 n. 13 (N.D.N.Y.
1984) ("The right to challenge the impending attachment ... is not predicated so much
on the nature of the defense that will be raised, e.g., a claimed exemption, as on the right
to raise any defense generally.").
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Duranceau v. Wallace.56 The statute contested in that case provided
procedures that enabled the state to collect past due child support
expeditiously. After receiving notice of the amount due and a statement that his property was subject to the collection action, the
debtor received copies, on two occasions, of an order served on his
employer to withhold and deliver. Even though only one of these
orders in any way indicated a wage exemption- and that was stated
only in summary-the court held that the debtor had received adequate notice because he was notified "of the existence of the wage
exemption." 5 7 The court further held that a notice, in ordinary
clear language, of the debtor's procedural rights provided him with
adequate notice of the "manner of asserting" his defenses, even
though, according to the debtor, the notice was defective in that it
did not "inform him of (a) his right to assert all his defenses and (b)
the procedures for challenging the seizure."5 8
In addition to examining whether the required notice informs
the judgment debtor that he or she may be entitled to an exemption
and that a motion may be filed to assert a defense or objection to the
garnishment, 59 courts might also consider whether specific information is given to the debtor with regard to the judgment. For example, the name and address of the judgment creditor, the date on
which judgment was entered, a form computing the current amount
due, the case number assigned to the writ of garnishment, and the
address of the court that issued the writ would also appear to be
relevant information. 6" Such information would not only refresh
the debtor's recollection of the event giving rise to the original judgment, but would also enable the debtor to recall whether that judgment has been vacated, has expired, or has been satisfied-all of
which constitute standard defenses or objections to the garnishment.6 ' Thus, the notice should equip the debtor with the ability to
formulate defenses that are based on the facts of his or her situation.
Furthermore, any arguable lack of detail regarding the type of
notice required to be sent to judgment debtors under postjudgment
garnishment procedures must be viewed in light of the debtor's duty
to inquire further once the notice is received. The district court in
56. 743 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1984).
57. Id. at 713 (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 713-14.
59. Maryland's postjudgment garnishment rules, for example, require this form of
notice. See MD. R.P. 3-645(c).
60. MD. R.P. 3-645(b) and (c) require this and similar information to be provided
postjudgment debtors upon attachment.
61. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5); MD. R.P. 3-643.
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Reigh v. Schleigh," - for example, made much of the fact that debtors
may be ignorant of the available exemptions and the process by
which claims for exemptions may be made." However, even if this
is true, debtors have no right to remain ignorant. Rather, if the notice does not fully address all the potential ramifications, the recipient is simply placed under a duty to inquire further."4 The duty of
further inquiry"5 is particularly clear in the case of a judgment
debtor because all judgment debtors have already received notice
from a court of law of the judgment against them.
The Reigh court's holding to the contrary may well be attributable to the fact that the court appears to have followed the remedy
mandated in Finberg and Deary v. Guardian Loan Co."6 In Finberg,
however, state law failed to require that the debtor be in any way
informed of the possible exemptions or of the procedures available
for asserting those rights.6 7 And in Deary state law failed to require

62. 595 F. Supp. 1535 (D. Md. 1984). The Fourth Circuit, however, recently reversed the district court and upheld the constitutionality of the Maryland rules governing postjudgment attachment procedures. Reigh v. Schleigh, No. 85-1021 (4th Cir.
Mar. 4, 1986). After noting the reasoning in the Finberg dissents and in Dionne v.
Bouley, 757 F.2d 1344 (1st Cir. 1985), the Fourth Circuit held, "[W]e are satisfied that a
notice which advises the judgment debtor that there are state and federal exemptions
that may be available to him, coupled with notice of the right to contest the attachment,
meets the requirements of due process." Reigh, slip op. at 13. The court also held that
because there was no evidence of an extended delay by the state courts in resolving
challenges to garnishment proceedings, the district court erred in holding that the requirement for a "prompt" hearing, if requested, violated due process. Id. at 18.
63. Id. at 1555-56.
64. In re Gregory, 705 F.2d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 1983). See also Soberal-Perez v.
Heckler, 717 F.2d 36, 43 (2d Cir. 1983) and cases cited therein (non-English-speaking
individual served with notice in English has "duty of further inquiry"); Wilson v. Heckler, 580 F. Supp. 1387, 1393 (D.D.C. 1984) ("opportunity to inquire about the method
of computation or indeed, about any other matter regarding the notice, certainly offsets
any prejudice . . . from the lack of detail").

65. Last term, the Supreme Court reiterated this very principle when holding a notice of changes in food stamp benefits constitutionally adequate. Atkins v. Parker, 105 S.
Ct. 2520 (1985). The notice in Atkins did not inform recipients whether their food stamp
allotment would be reduced or terminated, or indicate in what amount benefits would be
reduced, or provide information necessary to determine if an error had been made in
calculating benefits. Id. at 2525-26 n. 15. Nevertheless the Court held the notice sufficient to "prompt" a recipient to make an "appropriate inquiry," reasoning, "The entire
structure of our democratic government rests on the premise that the individual citizen
is capable of informing himself about the particular policies that aflect his destiny. To
contend that this notice was constitutionally insufficient is to reject that premise." Id. at
2531.
66. 534 F. Supp. 1178 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
67. 634 F.2d at 61-62.

1986]

POSTJUDGMENT DUE PROCESS

that any notice of the garnishment be sent to the debtor." Because
those decisions addressed statutes that either failed to provide notice of any kind, or provided for a form of notice that contained no
information concerning the availability of possible exemptions or
the procedures for claiming them, it is understandable, although
perhaps not justifiable, why sweeping remedies were imposed."' In
any event, no alternative remedy or middle ground seems to have
been suggested to those courts; certainly no such remedy was rejected. By contrast, in Reigh the court was presented with a middle
ground, i.e., a state procedure that while not providing the detailed
notice required by the Finberg and Deary courts, certainly required a
form of notice superior to that struck down in those cases. 7" The
determination of what due process requires necessarily and obviously entails an examination of the particular circumstances of each
7
case. '
This point is graphically illustrated by a comparison of two decisions, both of which address the same postjudgment statutory procedure, one before it was revised, and the other after revision. In
1982 the relevant New York statute contained no requirement that
the debtor be notified, either of the seizure or the possible exemptions, or of procedures available for asserting those exemptions. In

Deary v. Guardian Loan Co., the district court found this statute unconstitutional, holding that judgment debtors were "entitled to notice of both (1) the exemptions to which they may be entitled and (2)
the procedures for asserting those exemptions. "72 The New York
legislature then amended the statute to provide for a notice which
68. 534 F. Supp. at 1182. Indeed, not only Demy, but all of the Finbeig progeny except Reigh have involved statutes that either failed to provide any notice of the garnishment procedures, see Clay v. EdwardJ. Fisher, Jr., M.D., Inc., 584 F. Supp. 730, 733 (S.D.
Ohio 1984); Dionne v. Bouley, 583 F. Supp. 307, 308 n.l (D.R.I. 1984); Phillips v.
Robinson Jewelers, Inc., No. CIV-81-190-BT (W.D. Okla. 1982); or, if notice was provided, failed to require that it be timely. See Harris v. Bailey, 574 F. Supp. 966 (W.D. Va.
1983); Simler v.Jennings, Civ. No. C-1-78-618 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (magistrate's opinion).
69. See, e.g., Clay v. Edward J. Fisher, Jr., M.D., Inc., 584 F. Supp. 730, 734 (D. Ohio
1984) (order enjoining "the practice of executing upon personal property of judgment
debtors prior to providing such debtors with notice of the right to claim exemptions and
an opportunity to be heard on the claim"); Simler v.Jennings, Civ. No. C-1-78-618 (S.D.
Ohio 1982) (court expressly "declined" to mandate a detailed notice even when striking
down a statute that provided no timely notice). See also Dionne v. Boulev, 583 F. Supp.
307, 317-18 (D.R.I. 1984), ard in part, rev'd i part, 757 F.2d 1355 (1st Cir. 1985) (concluding that even though debtors under present law are given no notice of the attachment, they are entitled only to notice of the exemptions to which they may be entitled
and the procedures for asserting those exemptions).
70. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
71. See Alathews, 424 U.S. at 334; Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
72. 534 F. Supp. at 1187.
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(1) listed some, but not all, exemptions, and (2) rather than detailing any procedures for asserting exemptions, simply informed the
debtor that he or she could consult a lawyer, including Legal Aid, or
the garnishee.7" When the revised statute was challenged in McCahey v. L. P. Investors,7 4 the district court, while specifically acknowledging that "the notice does not outline the procedure itself or spell
out the specific steps that a debtor must take to assert an exemption," found the notice constitutionally adequate because "it clearly
alerts the debtor of her rights."7 5 On appeal, the Second Circuit
affirmed, remarking, "We are not persuaded even that this additional information would be helpful, much less that it is constitu76
tionally required."
In sum, an elaborate notice listing specific exemptions and the
procedures for pursuing them may be helpful to postjudgment
debtors, and it may be a good idea,7 7 but it is not constitutionally
required. Judgment debtors need only be afforded notice that state
and federal exemptions may be available and that they have a right
to contest a garnishment by filing a motion asserting a defense or
objection. Such notice is entirely adequate to protect the postjudgment debtors rights and, accordingly, comply with the requirements
of due process. Interestingly, this notice is almost exactly the kind
recently mandated by the First Circuit in Dionne v. Bouley, 78 in which
the court observed:
We do not agree that, to be constitutional, the notice provided to a judgment debtor after attachment must inform
him of all, or even close to all, of the available exemptions ....
[W]e think the debtor must be informed of the attachment and of the availability of a prompt procedure to challenge the
attachment, together with the fact, generally stated, that there
73. McCahey v. L.P. Investors, 593 F. Supp. 319, 322-23 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
74. Id. at 328.

75. Id.
76. 774 F.2d 543, 550 (2d Cir. 1985).
77. But see Harris v. Bailey, 574 F. Supp. 966, 971 (W.D. Va. 1983) ("There comes a
point where too much information confuses rather than clarifies." Accordingly, "only essential
exemptions" that provide for the "basic necessities of life" must be listed on the notice
and "the complex myriad of state and federal exemptions" need not "be set out on the
summons.") (emphasis added); McCahey, 774 F.2d at 550 ("Elaborate explanation of the
procedures for asserting an exemption may so confuse a layman that he or she may be
put off by the complexities and simply allow the seizure."); Duranceau, 743 F.2d at 714
(summarizing relevant rules of civil procedure "would make the notice so long as to
discourage the debtor from reading it"); Finberg, 634 F.2d at 84 (Aldisert, J., dissenting)
("[Tihere are so many exemptions that to set forth this information on a writ would
present a mass of incomprehensible boilerplate reeking with legalese.").
78. 757 F.2d 1344 (lst Cir. 1985).
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are certain exemptions under state andfederal law which the debtor
may be entitled to claim with respect to the attached property.
The state, however, is not required to supply the debtor with a "laundry list" of statutory exemptions.. . . A detailed requirement of this
type-which would have to be constantly updated whenever
state or federal law was revised-contradictsthe spirit of modnotices to be effected in a single,
ern civil procedurewhich encourages
79
concise and direct matter.

The First Circuit commented that, although "the state is free to
adopt such an elaborate [notice] requirement if it wants, we do not
think the Constitution compels it."" 0 Using this same reasoning, the
Second Circuit in McCahey v. L.P. Investors rejected a judgment
debtor's argument that a notice lacking such specificity was constitutionally inadequate." Thus, Dionne and McCahey are the first federal
circuit court cases to note this difference between legislative prerogative and judicial interpretation, as well as being the most recent
appellate court cases to address the notice issue in garnishment
cases. These decisions may very well halt, or at least curb, the trend
that courts have recently followed of requiring detailed notice.8 "

IV.
A.

HEARING

Garnishment Cases

In applying the Mathews test in garnishment cases to determine
the rights of postjudgment debtors to a hearing, Finberg and its
progeny initially analyzed the first and third Mathews factors, i.e., the
private interests involved and the governmental interests at issue.
With regard to the private interests at stake, these courts recognized
"the creditor's interest in the enforcement of the judgment debt and
79. Id. at 1354 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
80. Id. at 1354. See also Atkins v. Parker, 105 S. Ct. 2520, 2530-32 (1985) (general,
rather than "detailed," notice of change in benefits is all that is constitutionally
required).
81. 774 F.2d at 550-52. The Second Circuit refused to require a more detailed notice that would simplify the exemption procedure and facilitate its use by debtors as their
own counsel:
New York of course could provide simplified procedures for hearing these
claims. However, we find no support for the assertion that New York must provide such procedures as a requirement of due process. No matter how laudatory the goal, judicial experience with pro se litigants offers no guarantee that a
simplified procedure for use by laymen is better than a more complex procedure used by lawyers. Absent such a guarantee, the requirements of due process do not dictate use of one method rather than another.
Id. at 551 (emphasis in original).

82. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit in Reigh v. Schleigh approved a more modest notice than that imposed by the district court.
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the debtor's interest in continued use and possession of her property. ' " Since a bank account could very well contain money "required for the basic expenditures of living," 8 4 the debtor was
entitled to "an especially prompt hearing." 5 On the other hand,
since a judgment had already been entered against the judgment
debtor, he or she was assigned the burden of acting swiftly once the
attachment procedure began. In sum, judgment creditors were recognized to have a "strong interest" in the "prompt and inexpensive
satisfaction of the debt owed by the judgment debtor," an interest
which is to be accorded "[m]ore weight . .. in a postjudgment context than in prejudgment situations, because there is no question as
to the debtor's liability." 8 6
With regard to the third Mathews factor-the government's interests-Finberg and its progeny recognized that these include ensuring the enforcement of judgments and efficient procedures for
doing so, maintaining the integrity of the judicial system by preventing asset dissipation by absconding debtors, and assuring the ability
of its citizens to maintain a minimal standard of living.8 7 Additionally, consideration was given to the burden on state courts and other
8
agencies of changing the procedures used. 8
,'3

Although analysis of the first and third Mathews factors in recent
cases appears to be largely straightforward and accurate,"9 analysis
of the second Mathews factor-i.e., the risk of erroneous deprivation
under the challenged state hearing procedures-is lacking. The relevant inquiry should be: Do the postjudgment garnishment hearing
procedures, taken together, afford adequate protection from erroneous deprivations; and if not, what is the benefit of additional or
substitute hearing procedures?" ° Rather than considering these
questions fully, a number of courts have assumed that the risk of erroneous deprivation under challenged hearing procedures was great,
and that more due process-in the form of an even more prompt
hearing and even a prompt adjudication (rather than just a hearing)83. Finberg, 634 F.2d at 58.
84. Id. at 59.
85. Id.
86. Reigh, 595 F. Supp. at 1552.
87. Finbeig, 634 F.2d at 57. See also McCahei,, 593 F. Supp. at 327-28; Harris v. Bailey,
574 F. Supp. 966, 969 (W.D. Va. 1983).
88. See Deay, 534 F. Supp. at 1186-87.
89. It seems, however, that in the absence of a Supreme Court decision expressly
overruling Endirolt-Johnson, courts perhaps could have been even less deferential to the
importance of the private interest of the judgment debtor.
90. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
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was necessarily "better" due process.:"
Thus, in Finberg, the court held that a state procedure under
which a hearing could not be held sooner than fifteen days after attachment did not provide a prompt enough hearing and therefore
violated the debtor's due process rights."2 A number of courts have
followed Finberg in striking down state procedures that they regarded as not providing prompt enough hearings. 9" Some have4
held that a hearing must be held within a specified period of time; 9
however more often courts have declined to impose a specific time
limit, holding simply that hearings must be "prompt" or
"expeditious." 5
Furthermore, postattachment procedures that require a
"prompt" or "early" hearing have generally been upheld. For example, in Trans-Asiatic Oil, Ltd. S.A. v. Apex Oil Co. ,96 the First Circuit
recently upheld a postattachment procedure requiring a "prompt"
hearing when the debtor "received notice within two days of execution of the attachment and was granted a hearing withinfour weeks of
its request for an expedited hearing."9 7 And in Brown v. Liberty Loan
Corp., the Fifth Circuit approved a procedure that did not require an
91. See Finberg, 634 F.2d 50; Clay v. Edward J. Fisher, Jr., M.D., Inc., 584 F. Supp.
730 (S.D. Ohio 1984); Dionne, 583 F. Supp. 307; Harris v. Bailey, 574 F. Supp. 966 (W.D.
Va. 1983). This exceeds that which is required by the Supreme Court when testing the
constitutionality of a state procedure. "The Federal Constitution does not invalidate
state legislation because it fails to embody the highest wisdom or provide the best conceivable remedies." Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 550-51
(1949). See also Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 110-11 (1921) ("The due process clause
does not impose upon the states a duty to establish ideal systems for the administration
of justice, with every modern improvement and with provision against every possible
hardship that may befall."); cf. Dionne v. Bouley, 757 F.2d 1344, 1354 (1st Cir. 1985)
(recognizing that the Constitution does not compel states to adopt "elaborate" notice
requirements).
92. Fmbeg, 634 F.2d at 59-61.
93. See, e.g., Clay v. Edward J. Fisher, Jr., M.D., Inc., 584 F. Supp. 730, 733 (D. Ohio
1984); Dionne, 583 F. Supp. at 318; Harris v. Bailey, 574 F. Supp. 966, 970 (W.D. Va.
1983); Dear,, 534 F. Supp. at 1188.
94. Reigih, 595 F. Supp. at 1557 (14 days). See also Phillips v. Robinson Jewelers, No.
CIV-81-190 BF (W.D. Okla. 1982) ("The debtor must be given a prompt hearing on his
application preferably within 10 days or less.") (emphasis added); cf. Betts v. Tom, 431 F.
Supp. 1369, 1378 (D. Hawaii 1977) (two working days).
95. Dionne, 583 F. Supp. at 318 (hearing must be "expeditious" but no time restrictions imposed); Clay v. EdwardJ. Fisher, Jr., M.D., Inc., 584 F. Supp. 730, 733 (1). Ohio
1984) (hearing must be "prompt," no time restrictions required): Dear, 534 F. Supp. at
1188 (while opining in dicta the need for a prompt hearing, the court nevertheless declined to state how many days would constitute promptness). See also North Georgia Finishing, 419 U.S. at 606-07 (1975) (emphasizing the need for an "early" hearing rather
than an "immediate" hearing and declining to impose a specific time limit).
96. 743 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1984).
97. Id. at 962 (emphasis added). The fact that the procedure in .Ipex Oil addressed a
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"immediate" hearing, but which "appeared" to be "expeditious." '
This approach would clearly seem to be correct, for all that due
process requires is that a person be afforded an opportunity to be
heard "at a meaningful time.""9 Moreover, a state legislature has
the resources and opportunities to consider the needs and rights of
creditors or debtors generally in light of numerous factors-e.g., the
usual practice, congestion in the judicial system-in formulating a
statutory requirement with regard to the timing of a hearing; these
resources and opportunities are simply unavailable to any court.
Thus, a court should be very reluctant to substitute a judicial policy
preference for a legislative scheme.'°°
For this reason, the lack of any evidence that hearings were not
actually held at a meaningful time has led several courts to refuse to
hold that state law did not require a prompt enough hearing.,'0 As
explained in Deary v. Guardian Loan Corp.:
Recognizing the presumption of constitutionality attaching
to legislative acts, it is nevertheless clear that the sufficiency
of the . . . procedures depends upon their application in
practice and the debtor's actual ability to secure relief without significant delay. No party in this action has presented
evidence of the use of [the challenged state laws] to claim
exemptions from restraint and execution, and thus we are
unable to determine if those provisions would in practice
satisfy the need for a prompt opportunity to be heard.'
maritime attachment as opposed to the attachment of an individual's bank account containing exempt funds does not make it inapposite because, as the Supreme Court has
pointed out:
It may be that consumers deprived of household appliances will more likely
suffer irreparably than corporations deprived of bank accounts, but the
probability of irreparable injury in the latter case is sufficiently great so that
some procedures are necessary to guard against the risk of initial error. We are
no more inclined now than we have been in the past to distinguish among different kinds of property in applying the Due Process Clause.
North Georgia Finishing, 419 U.S. at 608.

98. 539 F.2d at 1368. See also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487,
1496 (1985), in which the Court held that the due process requirement that a hearing be
held at a "meaningful time" was not violated by a nine-month delay in finally adjudicating a dismissed employee's administrative appeal.
99. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
100. Cf. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 303
(1981) (error for district court to reduce statutorily prescribed time period in which a
response must be made to a request for temporary relief).
101. See, e.g., Brown, 539 F.2d at 1368; see also .1cCahev, 774 F.2d at 553 ("IW~e are
unwilling to invalidate a statute because it might, but need not, be applied in an unconstitutional manner.").
102. 534 F. Supp. at 1188.
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The mere possibility of future abuse pertaining to a postattachment hearing procedure is an insufficient basis for finding the procedure unconstitutional." 3 Thus, Finberg should not be read as
authority for the conclusion that a procedure requiring merely a
"prompt" hearing must be held unconstitutional simply because a
hearing is not mandated within fifteen days of attachment. In the
absence of evidence that postattachment hearings are not, in fact,
held promptly, it is difficult to see how the additional requirement of
a specific time limit would necessarily lessen the risk of erroneous
deprivation. However, in fairness to the Finberg court, that was perhaps not its intent,'0 4 for when the Third Circuit concluded that "fifteen days" was "too long," it was because this was the usual minimal
period of time that had to elapse before the debtor could obtain a
hearing.'0 5 In its two and one-half page discussion of the timeliness
of the postjudgment hearing, the Finberg court spoke of due process
as requiring that a debtor be permitted a "prompt" hearing, or be
heard "promptly," or be afforded a sufficient measure of "promptness" no fewer than thirteen times. 10 6 Therefore, the thrust, if not
the actual holding, of Finberg with regard to the timing of the hearing appears to have been an eminently reasonable attempt to apply
the Mathews test.
There is, however, one aspect of the Finberg holding regarding
timing that appears to be totally unjustified. Although, as noted
above, Finberg emphasized the need for a prompt hearing, the Third
Circuit also observed in passing that a judgment debtor is entitled
to "a prompt .. .adjudication." ' 0 7 This suggests that even if no

hearing is requested, a debtor is nevertheless entitled to have his or
her claim "adjudicated" promptly. Since most state procedures require that a hearing be conducted,'0 8 this suggestion may be largely

103. Apex Oil, 743 F.2d at 963.
104. Only the Reigh court has read Finberg to require this, and Reigh is the only case in
which a state procedural postjudgment garnishment statute requiring a "prompt" hearing has been held unconstitutional. The district court's conclusion that the state must
specifically provide that a hearing be held within two weeks, 595 F. Supp. at 1557, however, was reversed on appeal, Reigh v. Schleigh, No. 85-1021, slip op. at 13-14 (4th Cir.
Mar. 4, 1986).
105. 634 F.2d at 59.
106. Id. at 59-61.
107. Id. at 61.
108. See, e.g., VA. CODE §§ 8.01-512.4 & -512.5 (1984); PA. R. Civ. P. 3123.1. 3252
(1985). Cf.N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAw §§ 5239-40 (McKinney 1978) (permitting challenge to
garnishment without specifically providing hearing on exemption claim).
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academic. 1" However, courts have long held that when one fails to
request a hearing or "sleeps on his rights," that person cannot claim
that he or she has been denied due process upon being denied a
hearing.' "' It would, therefore, be anomalous to suggest that a person who failed to request a hearing would not be denied due process and is nonetheless entitled to a quick adjudication of his or her
rights. Only one court has so held and that ruling is being challenged on appeal."'
B.

Child Support Obligors

Recently, a number of state programs that permit the interception of income tax refunds due individuals who are delinquent in
their court ordered child support obligations.I 2 have been challenged because, inter alia, they allegedly fail to provide child support
1
obligors with the opportunity for a hearing at a meaningful time.'
109. However, in the one instance in which state law required that a hearing be provided only "if requested," the court held, relying on Finberg, that if a hearing was not
requested, a judgment debtor was entitled to have his case adjudicated within two
weeks. Reigh, 595 F. Supp. at 1557.
110. Accord Roslindale Coop. Bank v. Greenwald, 638 F.2d 258, 261 (1st Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 831 (1981) ("We cannot be sympathetic to a party who elects to
forego the hearing provided him, and then complains he received none."); FDIC v.
American Bank Trust Shares, Inc., 629 F.2d 951, 954 (4th Cir. 1980) (what is necessary
is that a postseizure hearing be available, not that it be held); see Mitchell v. W.T. Grant
Co., 416 U.S. 600, 610 (1974); see also Beckham v. Harris, 756 F.2d 1032, 1038 (4th Cir.
1985) (the Constitution does not require a governmental agency "to provide a hearing
to one who sleeps on his rights" to request one); United States v. An Article of Device
"Theramatic," 715 F.2d 1339, 1343 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Cloward v.
United States, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984) (a "defendant cannot contend that he did not obtain a prompt hearing when he chose not to avail himself of an opportunity to present
his claim"); cf. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp.. 456 U.S. 461, 485 (1982) (plaintiWs
failure to avail himself of full procedures provided by state law does not constitute sign
of law's inadequacy); Oberlander v. Perales, 740 F.2d 116, 120 (2d Cir. 1984) (same).
11. Reigh, 595 F. Supp. at 1557, vacated and remanded, No. 85-1021 (4th Cir. Mar. 4,
1986).
112. 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-667 (1982) governs the use of federal income tax refunds for
child support purposes and is administered and implemented pursuant to state statutes
and regulations. All states will soon be required to pass legislation permitting interception of state income tax refunds. See Act of Aug. 16, 1984, Pub. L. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1305
(1984) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(3)(1982)).
113. Presley v. Regan, 604 F. Supp. 609 (N.D.N.Y. 1985); Coughlin v. Regan, 584 F.
Supp. 697 (D. Me. 1984); McClelland v. Massinga, 600 F. Stipp. 558 (D. Md. 1984), rev'd
and remanded, No. 85-1138 (4th Cir. Mar. 18, 1986); Jahn v. Regan, 584 F. Stipp. 399
(E.D. Mich. 1984); Keeney v. Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, No. Civ. 832427 Kn (C.). Cal. 1983); Nelson v. Regan, 560 F. Supp. 1101 (D. Conn. 1983). ajfdon
othergrounds, 731 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied snb non. Manning v. Nelson, 105 S.
Ct. 175 (1984); Hudson v. Tweed, Civ. No. 82-363-WKS (D. Del. 1983) (magistrate's
opinion), ft'd, 749 F.2d 26 (3d Cir. 1984); Marcello v. Regan, 574 F. Supp. 586 (D.R.I.
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Although the status of child support obligors is substantially similar,
if not identical, to that of postjudgment debtors,' "4their due process right to a timely hearing has been viewed quite differently by
some courts.
Unlike the postjudgment garnishment cases, in which courts
have unanimously held that judgment debtors are not entitled to a
hearing until after attachment, some courts that have addressed the
due process rights of child support debtors have held that these
debtors are entitled to a predeprivation hearing.'' 5 Such a holding
is inexplicable. For although the interests involved in the child support obligor cases are not exactly the same as those at stake in the
garnishment cases, application of the Mathews test would seem to
lead to the conclusion that child support obligors are less, rather
than more, entitled to a predeprivation hearing than ordinary judgment debtors.
However, before examining the application of the Mathews test
in the obligor cases, it is worth noting that a wholly independent
basis for questioning the holding of some courts that child support
obligors are entitled to a predeprivation hearing might be found in
the Endicott-Johnson rationale. As previously indicated,' I6 the applicability of Endicott-Johnson has recently been questioned, principally
because that case did not involve seized property statutorily exempt
from attachment and because it preceded more recent Supreme
Court decisions that discuss the due process rights of prejudgment
debtors."l 7 However, not one of the cases that question EndicottJohnson has held that judgment debtors must be provided a hearing
prior to attachment.' 18 Rather, in every such case, the court recognized that the Endicott-Johnson holding was controlling in this regard
1983); Sorenson v. Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, 557 F. Supp. 729
(W.D. Wash. 1982), afl'd on other gounds, 752 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1985).
114. See supra note 5.
115. Compare cases recognizing right to preintercept hearing, e.g., Nelson v. Regan,
560 F. Supp. 1101, 1111 (D. Conn. 1983), afld on other grounds, 731 F.2d 105 (2d Cir.
deniedsub nom. Manning v. Nelson, 105 S. Ct. 175 (1984); Marcello v. Regan,
1984), cert.
574 F. Supp. 586, 596-98 (D.R.I. 1983) with cases stating no such right exists, e.g.,Jahn
v. Regan, 584 F. Supp. 394,413-17 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Keeney v.Secretary of the Treasurv of the United States, No. Civ. 83-2427Kn (C.D. Cal. 1983); Hudson v. Tweed, Civ.
No. 82-363-WKS (1). Del. 1983) (magistrate's opinion), afd, 749 F.2d 26 (3d Cir. 1984).
116. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
118. See, e.g., Dionne, 757 F.2d 1344; Finbeig, 634 F.2d 50; Neeley v. Century Fin. Co.,
606 F. Stipp. 1453 (D. Ariz. 1985); Reigh, 595 F. Supp. 1535; VcCahev, 593 F. Stipp. 319:
Clay v.Edward J. Fisher, Jr., M.D., Inc., 584 F. Supp. 730 (S.D. Ohio 1984): Harris v.
Bailey, 574 F. Supp. 966 (W.I). Va. 1983); Deary, 534 F. Supp. 1178: Betts v.Tom, 431 F.
Supp. 1369 (D. Hawaii 1977).
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and that a prompt postattachment hearing is the very most to which
a postjudgment debtor is entitled.' ' Yet, in the cases in which
courts have held that child support obligors are entitled to a
predeprivation hearing, the courts have either ignored Endicott-John20
son or dismissed it without any real explanation.
Equally puzzling is how application of the Mathews test could
lead these courts to conclude that a predeprivation hearing is necessary, for in applying the Mathews test, the Supreme Court has consistently found an interest based on "brutal need" a necessary
condition precedent to the requirement of a predeprivation hearing. 1 An obligor's interest in a tax refund is simply not in any way
"akin" to a welfare recipient's "brutal need" for welfare pay23
ments, 12 2 or even a wage earner's interest in his or her wages.'
Indeed, virtually every court to consider the rights of child support
119. See supra note 118. Not even the Supreme Court's holding in Griffin, 327 U.S.
220, reh 'g denied, 328 U.S. 876 (1946), on which courts and commentators have relied in
questioning the applicability of Endicott-Johnson, see, e.g., Hanner, 390 U.S. at 741-42
(Douglas,J., dissenting), reh'g denied, 392 U.S. 917 (1968); Countryman, The Bill of Rights
and the Bill Collector, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 521, 545 (1973); Dunham, Post-Judgment Seizures:
Does Due Process Require Notice and Hearing?, 21 S.D.L. REV. 78, 79-82 (1976); Levy, Attachment, Garnishment and Garnishment Execution: Some American Problems Considered in the Light of
the English Experience, 5 CONN. L. REV. 399, 434-38 (1973), is inconsistent with the proposition that child support obligors have a right to only a postdeprivation hearing. For in
Griffin, the execution was based on a judgment "entered without actual notice to or appearance by petitioner, and without any form of service of process calculated to give him
notice of the proceedings." 327 U.S. at 228. Thus, Griffin addressed a situation in which
the alimony obligor was not afforded any notice or opportunity for a hearing. This
should be sharply contrasted with the various tax refund intercept programs, which provide many procedural safeguards, both before and after the interception. See, e.g., infra
notes 140-151 and accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., McClelland v. Massinga, 600 F. Supp. 558 (D. Md. 1984), rev'd and remanded, No. 85-1138 (4th Cir. Mar. 18, 1986); Nelson v. Regan, 560 F. Supp. 101 (D.
Conn. 1983); Marcello v. Regan, 574 F. Supp. 586 (D.R.I. 1983).
121. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 1493 (1985)
("We have described the 'root requirement' of the Due Process Clause as being 'that an
individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant
property interest.' ") (emphasis in original) (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.
371, 379 (1971)). In Mathews itself, in which the claim to disability payments was arguably based on far greater need than the claim to the tax refund here, the Supreme Court
did not require apredeprivation hearing. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Only in Goldberg v. Kelly
has the Court held that due process requires a predeprivation hearing similar to that
demanded by the obligors in these actions. 397 U.S. 254, 266 (1970). Something less
than a Goldberg-type hearing is sufficient when the private interest is not based on financial need. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 340-41.
122. Jahn v. Regan, 584 F. Supp. 399, 415 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (citing Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)).
123. Jahn v. Regan, 584 F. Supp. at 415 (citing Sniadach, 395 U.S. 337). Even the
Sniadach Court, though requiring some type of predeprivation hearing, was "entirely
silent" on what the hearing must entail. See .1Iathews, 424 U.S. at 333-34.
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obligors in this context has recognized that the obligor's interest in
a tax refund, while "significant," is "not as great as that of the loss
of welfare benefits."'' 24 In fact, the obligor's interest in a tax refund
is not even as significant as the judgment debtor's interest in exempt
property, which judgment creditors sought to attach in the garnishment cases; it is not vital to survival in the way exempt property
(e.g., AFDC or social security payments) often is.
Furthermore, the obligor's interest "is not hinged on the immediacy of receiving the refund" since "[t]ax refunds normally take
some time to be determined and sent to the taxpayer,"' 2 5 and child
support obligors do not have the same interest as judgment debtors
in the "continued use and possession of [their] property. "126 The
very fact that the obligor is not in possession of the refund distinguishes his or her situation from that in Finberg, in which the debtor,
a sixty-eight-year-old widow whose sole source of income was derived from social security retirement benefits, was suddenly deprived of the use of her bank accounts.1 27 Of course, not even in

124. McClelland v. Massinga, 600 F. Supp. 558, 566 (D. Md. 1984), rev'd and remanded,
No. 85-1138 (4th Cir. Mar. 18, 1986) (quoting Nelson v. Regan, 560 F. Supp. 1106,
1108 (D. Conn. 1983), aff'd on other grounds, 731 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, sub
nom. Manning v. Nelson, 105 S. Ct. 175 (1984)). See also Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S.
642, 648 (1974) (a "tax refund is not the weekly or other periodic income required by a
wage earner for his basic support" and therefore a consumer protection act's restrictions on garnishment does not prevent the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy from reaching
a tax refund);Jahn v. Regan, 584 F. Supp. at 415; Keeney v. Secretary of the Treasury of
the United States, No. Civ. 83-2427 Kn (C.D. Cal. 1983) (obligor's interest in refund is
not "essential, vital or necessary for existence"); Marcello v. Regan, 574 F. Supp. 586,
596 (D.R.I. 1983) (interception of refund "is far from the kind of deprivation described

in Goldberg v. Kelly").
125. Jahn v. Regan, 584 F. Supp. at 415 (emphasis in original). For example, note
should be made of the length of time the taxpayers in the McClelland case were deprived
of refunds to which they supposedly were entitled. SeeJoint Appendix (Apx.) filed in the
Fourth Circuit, McClelland v. Massinga, No. 85-1138 at 49, 66 (refunds received Apr. 25
and Apr. 26, 1984, respectively). Unlike the federal government, the State of Maryland
does not pay interest on belated refunds. The absence of a similar state statutory interest provision suggests there is not even an entitlement to a "timely" refund. Even if
interest accrued as of April 15, however, neither claimant in McClelland would be "entitled" to a refund until April 15, 1984. The 10 or 11 days that expired between the dates
the refunds "should" have been received and when they actually were received falls far
short of that period of time courts have permitted to expire between the dates on which
a postattachment hearing (not resolution) is requested and when it actually takes place.
See, e.g., Apex Oil, 743 F.2d at 962 (1st Cir. 1984) (four weeks). Furthermore, the taxpayers in the refund intercept cases simply do not contend that they are immediately entitled to a refund, or that they are entitled to a refund within a set period of time.
126. Finberg, 634 F.2d at 58.
127. Id. at 51-52.
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that situation was the widow-debtor found entitled to a predepriva2

tion hearing. i

1

If it is clear, as it seems to be, that the obligor's interest in a tax
refund is not as critical as the debtor's interest in exempt property,
it is even clearer that the "creditor's" interest in enforcement of the
child support order is greater than that of the ordinary judgment
creditor. For the "creditor" in the obligor cases is not a merchant
or a credit card company, but rather a mother (typically) and her
minor children. As the Ninth Circuit recently recognized, there are
few interests more compelling than that of minor children dependent on child support: "The problem of delinquent child support is
national in scope, and has prompted Congress recently to enact
strong measures to help states collect these debts."''12 Since these
children have had their support rights declared by a court order,
they should, at the very least, be treated as well as ordinary judg13
ment creditors. Yet some courts have refused to do so. 0
The rights of children to receive court ordered financial support is intricately intertwined with the third factor of the Mathews
test-the government's interest. Not only is the support of its children often characterized as a "compelling state interest,"13' but the
128. Id. at 58. Perhaps it is because of these factors and because other procedures
exist for filing a claim for a tax refund that courts have taken the position that taxpayers
have no right to a hearing before they are deprived of their property by means of an IRS
levy. Furthermore, child support obligors often erroneously assume they are in fact entitled to the refund as though it belonged to them. To the contrary, states normally have
up to several years to collect taxes after they become due. Mathematical miscalculations
and/or the filing of a false or fraudulent return can give rise to a successful tax assessment by the controller. The mere completion of a tax return claiming a refund is not
dispositive of ownership. At the very least, this approach should be considered when
examining the taxpayer's interest in a tax refund. See Zernial v. United States, 714 F.2d
431, 434 (5th Cir. 1983); see also Martinez v. IRS, 744 F.2d 71, 72 (10th Cir. 1984);
Fredrick v. Clark, 587 F. Supp. 789, 792 (W.D. Wis. 1984). The State of Maryland offers
taxpayers such a procedure. MD. CODE ANN. art. 81, §§ 213-219 (1980 & Supp. 1984).
In fact, just last term the Supreme Court held that the IRS has the right to levy on joint
bank accounts, owned in part by a delinquent taxpayer, prior to an administrative or
judicial hearing. See United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 105 S. Ct. 2919, 2929
(1985).
129. Duranceau, 743 F.2d at 711 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Child Support Enforcement
Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1305 (1984)). See also Caswell v.
Lang, 757 F.2d 608, 610 (4th Cir. 1985) (state has a "compelling" interest in protecting
the welfare of its dependent citizens); Gorrie v. Heckler, 606 F. Supp. 368, 373 (D.
Minn. 1985).
130. See, e.g., McClelland v. Massinga, 600 F. Supp 558, 567 (D. Md. 1984), rev'd ald
remanded, No. 85-1138 (4th Cir. Mar. 18, 1986).
131. Duranceau, 743 F.2d at 711; Caswell v. Lang, 757 F.2d 608 (4th Cir. 1985) (past
due child support payments not included in bankruptcy plan because of state's "compelling interest in protecting the welfare of its dependent citizens"). Stich a governmental
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additional fiscal and administrative burdens that a state would incur
were it required to conduct predeprivation hearings, might be
passed on to the families who receive the benefits of the intercept
program.'112 Courts that have ordered such hearings appear to have
underestimated their fiscal and administrative impact by assuming
that the number of obligors who would request preintercept hearings, were they available, would not exceed the number of those requesting postintercept hearings. 133 However, not all obligors file
returns claiming a refund. Obligors are typically notified that ifthey
are to receive a refund, that refund may be intercepted. 134 Requirto fruition would be
ing a hearing on an issue that may never come
35
an enormous waste of a state's finances.'
Despite the child's "compelling" interest in receiving support,
the obligor's less than compelling interest in the refund, and the
governmental interest in avoiding the expense of extra hearings,
some courts have found the risk of erroneous deprivation created by
the intercept scheme to be so serious and so substantial as to require an extremely rigorous due process protection-i.e., a

interest in other settings has been regarded as sufficient justification for seizing property
without a predeprivation hearing, particularly when, as in McClelland v. Massinga, 600
F. Supp. 558 (D. Md. 1984), rev'd and remanded, No. 85-1138 (4th Cir. Mar. 18, 1986),
there exists a subsequent opportunity for the determination of rights. See, e.g., Bob
Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 746 (1974); Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc.,
339 U.S. 594, 599 (1950); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 596-97 (1931); Martinez v. IRS, 744 F.2d 71, 72 (10th Cir. 1984); Zernial v. United States, 714 F.2d 431. 434
(5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Articles of Hazardous Substances, 588 F.2d 39, 43 (4th
Cir. 1978); see also United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 105 S. Ct. 2919, 2925
(1985).
132. See Child Support Enforcement Program, State Plan Requirements, 45 C.F.R.
§ 302.33(d) & 303.102(f (1985). See also Act of Aug. 16, 1984, Pub. L. 98-378, 98 Stat.
1305 (1984) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 664(a) (1982)).
133. See, e.g., McClelland v. Massinga, 600 F. Supp. 558, 567 (D. Md. 1984), rei'd and
remanded, No. 85-1138 (4th Cir. Mar. 18, 1986).
134. See, e.g., MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 10-113(a)-(f) (1984 & 1985 Supp.): Mn.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 07, § 07.07.02.02-.04 (1984) (state income tax refund intercept program); Act of April 16, 1984, Pub. L. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1305 (1984) (amending 42 U.S.C.
§ 664(a) (1982)) (federal intercept program to be administered by the states).
135. See Maryland Review of the TRIP/FROP Appeals Unit, Brief of Appellants at
App. 27-29, McClelland v. Massinga, 600 F. Supp. 558 (D. Md. 1984), rev'd and remanded,
No. 85-1138 (4th Cir. Mar. 18, 1986). (Child Support Enforcement Agency reporting
that it had certified 51,682 obligors during the 1983 tax year, but only intercepted
13,752 refunds (27%)); cf. Coughlin v. Regan, 584 F. Supp. 697, at 709-10 n.21 (1). Me.
1984) (noting argument that 1% of approximately 335,000 offsets were adjusted as a
result of requests for refunds from nonobligated spouse's share of reftnd): Nelson v.
Regan, Civ. No. N-82-173, Ruling on Remedy and Final Order at 7 (1). Conn. 1983) (no
benefit by requiring preoffset allocation of nonobligated spouse's share of rclund).
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predeprivation hearing.'13 6 Such a finding would perhaps be understandable-though not justifiable, in light of Endicott-Johnsonand the
quality of the respective interests of the obligors and minor children-were the tax intercept procedure to provide only minimal
due process protections; however it is totally unwarranted when the
state procedure provides numerous safeguards. A comparison of
two recent cases-McClelland v. Massinga" 7 and Marcello v. Regan ' 8 -is illustrative of this point.
In Marcello, two obligors and an obligor's spouse successfully
challenged an intercept program implemented by the State of
Rhode Island in conjunction with the federal government. The
United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island held
that "a postdeprivation hearing" would not "be an appropriate alternative under the circumstances" and that the failure to provide
preintercept notice and a hearing to the complaining parties consti39
tuted a violation of their due process rights.'
In McClelland, the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland relied heavily on Marcello in holding that obligors are constitutionally entitled to a hearing prior to the interception of a tax
refund.' 4 0 Yet the procedures invalidated in McClelland were qualitatively superior in three fundamental respects to those held unconstitutional in Marcello. First, in Marcello, the only preintercept
"investigation" available was "a cursory cross-matching" of individual records and agency files,"' which did not take into account any
support payments made after the initial calculation of the past-due
amount, and in which the relevant state official had no authority to

136. See, e.g., Nelson v. Regan, 560 F. Supp. 1101 (D. Conn. 1983), aff'd on other
grounds, 731 F.2d 105 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nora. Manning v. Nelson, 105 S. Ct. 175
(1984); Marcello v. Regan, 574 F. Supp. 586 (D.R.I. 1983).
137. 600 F. Supp. 558 (D. Md. 1984), rev'd and remanded, No. 85-1138 (4th Cir. Mar.
18, 1986).
138. 574 F. Supp. 586 (D.R.I. 1983).
139. Id. at 598.
140. However, relying on Mathews v. Eldridge, the Fourth Circuit recently reversed
the district court decision, holding that the Maryland tax refund intercept procedure
satisfied the requirements of due process. McClelland v. Massinga, No. 85-1138 (4th
Cir. Mar. 18, 1986). The court observed that the Maryland procedure "clearly provides
the parent with as much of a pre-deprivation 'hearing' as was given the recipient in
Mathews or the employee in Loudermill," id., slip op. at 21, and distinguished other intercept procedure cases that have reached a different result by concluding that "these cases
were reviewing statutes and facts different in significant respects from those with which
we are concerned," id. at 26.
141. 574 F. Supp. at 589-90.
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delete names from the certified list or to correct errors. 44' 2 By contrast, the Maryland program at issue in McClelland provided a very
complete preintercept investigation; 4 3 payments made by an obligor after the arrearage was certified were taken into account in determining whether the obligor was in arrears,' 4 4 and the relevant
state official who conducted the investigation had the authority to
delete names from the list of certified individuals and to correct errors. Second, while there was apparently no written policy providing for postdeprivation hearings at the time the Marcello case was
instituted, 14 5 the Maryland statute struck down in McClelland contained an intricate postintercept administrative appeal process that
could be utilized to challenge any interception. It entitled an obligor to a full evidentiary hearing at which he or she could be represented by an attorney, present testimony, and cross-examine
witnesses. Finally, while "judicial review was not available" under
the statutes examined in the Marcello case,' 4 6 under Maryland law an
obligor dissatisfied with the final administrative decision was provided an opportunity to seek judicial review. In fact, a request for
an administrative hearing, as well as any subsequent requests for
judicial review, automatically stayed payment of the intercepted refund to the support recipient under Maryland law.
Thus, in almost every particular the Maryland statute provided
precisely the procedural safeguards that the Marcello court found
lacking in the Rhode Island law. Indeed, Maryland's intercept procedure reduced very substantially any real risk of error by providing
obligors with a preintercept opportunity to contest the arrearage,
which could lead to both deletion of the obligor's name from the

142. Id. at 599.
143. 600 F. Supp. at 560-61.
144. This same defense, and others, were made available under state law in Griffin,
327 U.S. at 227. Because the attachment procedure there did not afford the alimony
obligor any notice of the collection efforts, the obligor "was thus deprived of an opportunity to raise defenses otherwise open to him under the law of New York against the
docketing of judgment for accrued alimony, [and] there was a want of judicial due process." Id. at 228.
145. After suit was filed, Rhode Island "tentatively" set forth a procedure for postintercept hearings. 574 F. Supp. at 591 n.l 1. Interestingly, the Varcello court recognized that this procedure showed "some good faith attempt by the state to comply with
due process," but was "not at issue in this law suit." Id. These remarks at least suggest
that if the Marcello court had been presented with the Maryland statute, which provides
far greater due process protections, its conclusions might have been altogether different. See McCahev, 774 F.2d at 552 (recognizing that portion of notice, if viewed in isolation, may be misleading, but that any "harmful implications" are eliminated by other
satisfactory parts of the notice).
146. 574 F. Supp at 597.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 45:6 1

certified list, and a full due process hearing with an opportunity for
judicial review, after any interception.
In a similar context in which there existed no "brutal need" for
the property interest at stake, the Supreme Court recently noted,
"all the process that is due is provided by a pretermination opportunity to respond, coupled with posttermination administrative procedures."' 4 7 This would seem to be particularly true in a tax intercept
context because, typically, the only factors that justify cancellation
of an interception are findings that (1) the obligor is not under a
court order to pay child support through a public agency, or (2) the
obligor is not delinquent under the most recent child support order.' 4 8 Normally, there are no other grounds for defeating an interception. As the most recent court to consider the matter
recognized, "since the amount of arrearage is simply a matter of
record-keeping there is very little risk of error which would require
a preseizure hearing, '"149 especially when one considers that a state

agency, as opposed to a private individual, is responsible for calculating the past due amount.'5 0
Thus, the fact that the risk of erroneous deprivation is very low
suggests that the value of providing additional safeguards, such as a
preintercept hearing, is probably slight.'' Procedures that provide
a number of safeguards operate to ensure that inadvertent administrative errors are corrected swiftly and that no erroneous depriva-

tion occurs. '

52

147. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 1496 (1985) (emphasis
added) (right of public employee in continued employment). The Court expressly held
that "the existence of post-termination procedures is relevant to the necessary scope of
pre-termination procedures." 105 S. Ct. at 1496 n.12. Loudermill obviously demonstrates the great importance not only of the availability of a postintercept administrative
hearing, but also of the availability of judicial review in the Maryland program, a safeguard that was lacking in Rhode Island's program in .MIarcello. See also Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 13 (1979) ("[W]hen prompt postdeprivation review is available for
correction of administrative error, we have generally required no more than that the
pre-deprivation procedures used be designed to provide a reasonably reliable basis for
concluding that the facts justifying the official action are as a responsible governmental
official warrants them to be.").
148. See, e.g., MD.FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 10-1 13(a),(d),(g)(l), (1984 & Supp. 1985);
MD.ADMIN. CODE tit. 07, §§ 07.07.02.02B, 07.07.02.05A(3) (1984).
149. Jahn v. Regan, 584 F. Supp. 399, 415 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
150. Id. See also Duranceau, 743 F.2d at 712 (risk of error is low because sources of
error are few).
151. See Keeney v. Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, No. Civ. 83-2427Kn
at 8 (risk has been minimized as much as possible; value of additional safeguards would
be outweighed by the cost).
152. See Atkins v. Parker, 105 S. Ct. 2520, 2529 (1985) (Court refused to find procedures violated due process even though "inadvertent errors were made in calculating
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In the light of the substantial differences in the interests at stake
in the child support cases, the risk of an erroneous deprivation, particularly when state procedures provide numerous other protections, does not require the rigid interpretation that Finberg and its
progeny have applied in the garnishment cases. Accordingly, it
seems clear that child support obligors need not be afforded a hearing before their claimed tax refunds are intercepted.
V.

CONCLUSION

Since Endicott-Johnson defined the due process rights of
postjudgment debtors over a half century ago, no Supreme Court
decision has ruled to the contrary. Although literal adherence to its
dicta may no longer be warranted, due to the subsequent enactment
of exemption statutes and the line of Supreme Court decisions beginning with Sniadach, it is clear that courts should be bound by the
holding of Endicott-Johnson. Indeed, even the postjudgment garnishment cases decided after Mathews v. Eldridge have recognized that
judgment debtors are not entitled to notice and a hearing until their
property interests are executed upon. Because child support obligors have also had their day in court to contest their underlying liabilities, they too are entitled to no further legal process until after
attachment.
Due process simply requires notice informing debtors and obligors of the proceedings initiated against their property and of their
rights, guaranteed by law, to challenge these proceedings. The
Constitution, as interpreted by the federal courts, is designed only
to safeguard these rights. Thus, the relevant inquiry should be
whether the notice afforded by a governmental procedure satisfies
due process; beyond this, the courts have no discretion. It is the
task of the legislative branch of government to exercise its wisdom
to create the form of notice most appropriate for a given situation.
the benefits"; such errors "can occur in the administration of any large welfare program" and "by hypothesis an inadvertent error is one" the Government "did not anticipate"). Thus, even though two plaintiffs in VcClelland did not receive notice of
certification, both received their refunds in a timely manner (on April 26 and April 25
respectively). Such a slight delay is insignificant in a due process analysis. See Fusari v.
Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 389 (1975) (length of the deprivation is significant in evaluating impact of official action on private interest).
[T]he Due Process Clause has never been construed to require that the procedures used to guard against an erroneous deprivation of a protectible "property" or "liberty" interest be so comprehensive as to preclude any possibility of
error. The Due Process Clause simply does not mandale that all goverinental decisionmaking comply with standards that assure perfect, er'or-free determinationls.
Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 13 (1979) (emphasis added).
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Similarly, when addressing the timing of the legal process required by a particular procedure, courts should not define the outermost limits, but rather, the minimal standards imposed by the
Constitution. Decisionmaking that is consumed by attention to optimal time frames establishes difficult and confining precedent, for
"[t]he very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible
procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation."' 5 3
Requiring simply that postattachment hearings be held promptly allows courts the flexibility and adaptability they need.

153. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895
(1961).

